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Regulating Cyberharrassment: Some Thoughts on Sexual
Harassment 2.0
Feb 20, 2010

This post is part of an eleven-part series entitled Cyber Civil Rights. Click here for a PDF
version of the entire Cyber Civil Rights series. Click here for a PDF version of this post.
By Helen Norton
Introduction
Professor Franks’ Sexual Harassment 2.0 valuably builds on Professor Citron’s substantial
contributions to our understanding of cyberharassment in at least two ways. First, Professor
Franks joins Professor Citron in powerfully challenging the idealistic narrative of the Internet as
a primarily egalitarian institution. Both persuasively document the use of cyberharassment to
target and punish traditionally subordinated groups.
Second, Professor Franks thoughtfully responds to Professor Citron’s call for a conversation
about what a cyber civil rights agenda might involve. Professor Citron started that dialogue in
Cyber Civil Rights, where I was particularly fascinated by her discussion of the Violence
Against Women Act’s prohibition on the use of telecommunications devices to deliver certain
anonymous threats or harassment. I am less optimistic than Professor Citron, however, that other
existing civil rights laws—such as Title VII, Title IX, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981—might capture and
address cyberharassment’s harms.
The barriers to addressing cyberharassment under those statutes have very little to do with the
space in which the harassment occurs but instead everything to do with whether the harasser is
someone within the regulated institution’s control. Cyberharassers (assuming we can identify
them) are rarely supervisors, co-workers, teachers, or others subject to control by covered
employers and schools. In other words, the harasser frequently has no connection with, and is
thus not controllable by, the actors regulated by current civil rights laws.
Addressing such cyberharassment instead requires a new civil rights law. Professor Franks, for
example, intriguingly proposes that we hold website operators liable for the cyberharassment

facilitated by their websites. Here I raise some thoughts and questions for Professor Franks and
others interested in that route.
I.

What We Can Learn From the Past

This, of course, is just the most recent in a longstanding and important series of conversations
about the theoretical and practical relationship between speech and equality. Indeed, debates
over whether and when we should regulate hate speech and other forms of harassment in various
spaces are by no means new. So we might consider when and why we have—and have not—
protected certain spaces from harassment in the past and then ask how the contemporary
conversation over cyberspace compares to those past deliberations.
There may be a number of differences between those conversations past and present, but I flag
just one for now. As a practical matter, the regulation of harassment at work and school took
two steps. First, Congress claimed the space as protected by regulating conduct within that
space: it prohibited discrimination in employment through the enactment of Title VII in 1964 and
barred sex discrimination by federally funded educational institutions in 1972. Those statutes’
plain language focused on discriminatory conduct, such as discriminatory decisions about hiring,
firing, pay, admissions, scholarships, and so on.
Years later courts, policymakers, and the public took the second step when they came to
understand that illegal discrimination can include harassment, which often (but not always) takes
the form of speech. In other words, only later did we realize that meaningful protections against
discrimination in those spaces required the regulation of some speech in those spaces as well.
So, advocates first had to convince policymakers to regulate the space at all in the face of
vigorous resistance from opponents who raised concerns about free market interference and the
constraint of institutions’ discretionary choices, among others. And, second, we later recognized
that some forms of speech in that space can create equality harms sufficient to justify further
regulation.
Here, Professor Franks seeks to take both steps in the same bold move: to protect, and thus
regulate, a certain space that has not yet been regulated and (because speech comprises a
substantial part of what happens in that space) to regulate speech in that space.
To persuade folks to make that big leap, one must show that the harms of harassing speech in
this space are so great as to justify its regulation. This strikes me as a substantial challenge,
especially in light of our experience with civil rights legislation that targets very tangible harms.
For example, nearly twenty years passed before this year’s enactment of the Hate Crimes
Prevention Act, which addresses acts of physical violence in which the victims bleed, and
sometimes die. Sixteen years after its introduction (and more than thirty years after the
introduction of the first gay rights bill in Congress), the Employment Non-Discrimination Act —
which would prohibit job discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity—

has yet to be enacted. A cyberharassment statute strikes me as a particularly heavy lift in light of
this history.
Can that lift be made? In addition to preparing for a long haul, advocates for a new
cyberharassment law must answer at least two key questions. First, can we identify an agent of
control—someone who has the actual power to control equality harms that might occur in that
space? Second, should we hold them liable for harms that occur in this space? In other words,
should we regulate this space at all? Should we consider cyberspace a space in which
participants should be protected from harassment?
II.

Crafting a Viable Cyberharassment Statute

Professor Franks has persuasively answered the first question by identifying website operators as
agents of control over the cyberspace they create and manage. Holding them liable, however,
triggers a number of other challenges. The matter of remedies, for example, raises theoretical and
practical concerns about over-deterrence. If one parallels the remedies available under Titles VII
and IX to hold website operators liable for money damages for the injuries caused by
cyberharassment that occurs on their sites, the potential costs to website operators are quite
great—especially when compared to those faced by the harassers themselves, who (as Professor
Franks notes) would simply risk being denied access to those websites or having their posts
removed. This dynamic might well lead many website operators simply to prohibit private
parties from offering comments or postings—an outcome many might find troubling.
One response to those concerned by that outcome might be to build on the work of Charles
Lawrence, Catharine MacKinnon, and others in other contexts involving hate speech and
harassment. In other words, one might challenge a traditional zero-sum understanding of speech
and liberty (that treats speech restrictions as inevitably shrinking the universe of available speech
in a way that damages important First Amendment values) by explaining how cyberharassment
actually undermines free speech values by silencing the voices of members of traditionally
subordinated groups. Under this view, regulations specifically targeted at cyberharassment that
effectively silences other speakers may actually increase the overall universe of expression that
furthers significant First Amendment interests.
So there may be responses to such objections. But, on the other hand, legitimate concerns about
over-deterrence may suggest the need to think creatively about remedies, such that an entirely
new remedies regime might be appropriate in this context.
This leads to the second question: whether we should be protected from harassment in
cyberspace at all. Advocates must nail down with precision the underlying justification for
regulating those who control chunks of that space if they are to develop the political momentum
for, and to ensure the First Amendment validity of, such a statute.

In the past, policymakers chose to regulate harassment in employment and education largely
because such harassment caused such great harm to families’ economic security as well as to
individual dignity and autonomy in important spheres of American life. Quantifying the gravity
of harassment’s harm in those spaces not only made a strong case for regulation as a policy
matter, but also helped justify the regulation of speech in those spaces as constitutional under the
First Amendment. In other words, one way (but certainly not the only way) to explain antiharassment laws’ constitutionality is to recognize the regulated speech as posing substantial
harms without significantly furthering traditional First Amendment values. Indeed, we
frequently understand the First Amendment to permit the regulation of expression where the
harms of the targeted speech appear to outweigh its value in facilitating significant First
Amendment interests in self-expression, the discovery of truth, and participation in democratic
self-governance. Examples include threats, solicitation, defamation, fighting words, obscenity,
and misleading commercial speech.
Drawing these lines, however, has always been difficult and deeply controversial. A viable
cyberharassment law thus must target specific expression that both causes grave harms and is of
little First Amendment value. The Supreme Court sought to strike that balance under Title VII
with its requirement that speech rises to the level of actionable harassment only when it is
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive
working environment. A new statute’s political and constitutional prospects thus depend in great
part on identifying the nature and degree of cyberharassment’s harm with precision by carefully
articulating the importance of participating in cyberspace to our lives today apart from any
connection to workplace or educational harm. To be sure, cyberharassment’s harms can include
potential interference with employment or educational opportunities, as both Professors Citron
and Franks have explained. But what if the victim is unemployed or retired, or no longer in
school? Is there no harm caused by her cyberharassment? Regulating on-line website operators
requires advocates to focus on cyberharassment’s specific on-line harms, rather than the harms
that play out off-line in areas like employment and education that are beyond operators’ scope of
control.
Conclusion
Professors Citron and Franks have taken an important first step in identifying cyberspace
harassment issues and suggesting legislative responses to those harms. Those seeking legislation
must next make the case that deterring women from participating in cyberspace is a sufficiently
great harm to justify regulation of website operators or others who have control of that space,
and then to target that regulation to speech that is both harmful and of relatively low First
Amendment value (assuming that one seeks to regulate expression other than that which is
already actionable as threatening or defamatory).
Professor Franks starts to get at the first part of this calculus when she writes: “A world in which
members of certain groups avoid places, professions, opportunities, and experiences because
they fear not de jure discrimination but de facto discrimination, based not on their ideas but on

their bodies . . . is not a world that maximizes liberty.” Professor Citron has similarly described
how cyberharassment raises the price that subordinated groups must pay for their participation in
cyberspace. These are just the first steps in a long-term project for those who seek to develop a
statute with strong chances both to generate political support and withstand First Amendment
scrutiny.

